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Abstract 
This paper investigates the dynamics of R&D and capital investment using a large sample of 
US firms during the period 2002-2016. A partial adjustment approach is employed with a 
specific focus on the impact of the financial crisis on target adjustment speed. Evidence 
suggests that firms have a target in both types of investment and adjust to it at varying speeds. 
Specifically, firms adjusted to the capital investment target faster than to R&D investment. 
However, firms increased the adjustment speed in R&D investment significantly during the 
crisis, and it has remained at similar levels during the post-crisis period. The changes in 
adjustment speeds can be explained by several firm-specific characteristics that are related to 
the ability of firms to raise internal finance. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper investigates the dynamic investment behavior of firms with positive research 
and development (R&D) expenditures. The main objective of the study is to investigate how 
investment dynamics differ between R&D and fixed capital investment with a focus on the 
speed of target adjustment. This is done using a large sample of US firms during the period 
2002-2016. The sample period enables analysis of the investment decisions before, during and 
after the global financial crisis of 2007.  
The static view of investment stemming from the traditional neoclassical theory of 
investment assumes that firms operate around their optimal levels, and hence, the observed 
investment for an average firm at any time is not far from its desired level (see, e.g., Jorgenson, 
1963). This implies that when targets change and/or firms move away from their optimal 
investment (e.g., due to external shocks), they adjust back to their optimal one instantaneously. 
It is assumed that the costs of target adjustment are negligible. However, the dynamic view 
acknowledges that capital market imperfections are significant enough to have an impact on 
the adjustment process (Mueller, 2003; Bloom, Bond, & Van Reenen, 2007). It is argued that 
while firms desire to revert to their target investment, the desired adjustment is not completed 
instantly. There are delays in adjusting fully, rendering the adjustment only partial in the first 
instance.  
In a dynamic setting, the speed of adjustment is determined by a trade-off between two 
types of costs, namely, the costs of reverting back to the optimal investment (adjustment costs) 
and the costs of being away from the optimal investment (off-target costs). Although the 
underlying process is similar, this study argues that the nature of this trade-off, as well as the 
determinants of optimal levels, change between R&D and capital investments. The ability of 
firms to raise finance, the cost of financing, and whether investment projects are reversible and 
3 
 
firms can afford delaying investment expenditures are among the factors that influence the 
dynamics.  
It is well documented in the literature that firms pursue a target investment policy and 
that investment targets are variant over time and across firms (Gatchev, Pulvino, & Tarhan, 
2010; Dasgupta, Noe, & Wang, 2011). However, while previous research yields valuable 
insights into the dynamics of fixed capital investment, relatively little is known about the R&D 
adjustment process. More importantly, there is no prior work that specifically investigates how 
the speed of adjustment differs between R&D and capital investments and what determines the 
ability and incentives of firms to adjust to target investment levels. This paper advocates the 
view that the differences in adjustment speeds do not always stem from the varying adjustment 
costs between the two types of investment. It is argued that off-target costs are also likely to be 
heterogeneous across R&D and capital investments and can to some extent explain the 
observed differences in the adjustment dynamics of both investment targets.  
Additionally, this paper investigates how the global financial crisis of 2007 affected the 
speeds of adjustment in target R&D and capital investment. The financial crisis imposed 
common exogenous shocks that adversely affected the profitability and cash flows of firms as 
well as their ability to raise external finance. The availability of external funds during and after 
the crisis was also limited, in particular for new investment projects (Campello, Graham, & 
Harvey, 2010; Duchin, Ozbas, & Sensoy, 2010; Bliss, Cheng, & Denis, 2015). This study 
provides a detailed account of how the investment adjustment behavior of firms changed during 
and after the recent financial crisis in comparison to the pre-crisis period. This is done in 
relation to both R&D and capital investments. Additionally, the study investigates the firm-
specific characteristics that determine the differences in the speeds of adjustment in target 
levels. 
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The empirical analysis is conducted using a dataset that comprises 1,266 non-financial 
US firms during the period 2002-2016. The analysis is conducted in two stages. In the first 
stage, a target model and the speeds of adjustment for each type are estimated for the entire 
period. The estimations are then repeated separately for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis 
periods. In the second stage, further tests are conducted to shed light on the firm-specific 
characteristics that are likely to explain the different adjustment speeds across R&D and capital 
investments. This is done by classifying firms into sub-groups using firm-specific attributes 
that capture the extent of financial flexibility and their ability to raise external funding. In the 
paper, a partial adjustment model is estimated using the generalized method of moments 
(GMM) estimation procedure. This estimation method helps control effectively for firm 
heterogeneity and potential endogeneity, while recognizing that capital market conditions may 
impede a firm's ability to achieve its target investment levels.  
The empirical findings provide strong evidence that firms exhibit a long-term target 
behavior regarding both R&D and capital investment expenditures. In addition, the dynamics 
of investment behavior are supported - firms attempt to revert back to their optimal levels, 
albeit at different speeds with respect to each investment type and time period considered.  It 
is found that the average firm in the sample adjusted to its target R&D more slowly than capital 
investment. Furthermore, the difference became more significant during the crisis period 
despite that the adjustment was faster for both types. In the aftermath of the crisis period, firms 
reverted to their pre-crisis adjustment speed regarding capital investment while they maintained 
quicker adjustment towards target R&D. Further analysis shows that the ability of firms to 
adjust can be explained by firms’ dividend, cash holdings, leverage and stock issue/purchase 
decisions. The findings suggest that greater financial flexibility provides firms with higher 
ability to adjust, in particular to the R&D target.  
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This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, it contributes to the 
strand of the literature that emphasizes the differences between R&D and capital investments 
(Hall, 1992; Brown & Petersen, 2015; Peters &Taylor, 2017). There is consensus in the 
literature that the dynamics of R&D and capital investment are different. Moreover, the target 
adjustment costs for R&D are greater (Brown, Fazzari, & Petersen, 2009; Li, Liu, & Xue, 2014; 
and Peters and Taylor, 2017). However, the analysis of this paper expands the literature by 
providing a comparative empirical analysis with respect to the determinants of and dynamics 
of R&D and capital investments. Second, the study tests explicitly the impact of the financial 
crisis of 2007 on the speed of adjustment of both R&D and capital investments. In doing so, 
the firm-characteristics that can potentially explain the differences in observed speeds of 
adjustment are also considered. This analysis provides additional valuable insights into the 
interaction between firm-specific and firm-invariant external factors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses 
of investment adjustment speed. Section 3 derives empirical specifications from theory and 
describes methodology. Section 4 illustrates preliminary data analysis. Section 5 discusses the 
estimation results, and Section 6 offers the conclusions. 
 
 
2. Main predictions 
This study argues that the speed at which firms adjust to their desired levels of 
investment depends on the type of investment as well as a number of firm characteristics and 
exogenous shocks. In this respect, two important features of the adjustment process are 
considered. First, it is acknowledged that firms desire to invest optimally to maximize value 
and hence take up all the value-increasing investment opportunities. It is hence costly to be 
away from optimal investment levels (i.e., off-target costs). However, it is important to note 
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that a firm can be off-target not only by undershooting (underinvestment) but also by 
overshooting its investment target (overinvestment). Both sub-optimalities are assumed to be 
costly to firms and reduce firm value. Second, target adjustment often involves costs that are 
mainly determined by firm-specific as well as market-wide imperfections (i.e., adjustment 
costs). The relevant capital imperfections that affect the extent of adjustment costs include 
informational and agency problems as well as external adverse market conditions that constrain 
firms and make the cost of external finance greater.  
The discussion above implies that being away from optimal levels for long periods are 
likely to have a negative impact on firm value, and hence, despite the expected significant costs 
of adjustment, firms would attempt to revert back to their optimal as quickly as possible. That 
is, the speed of adjustment is clearly determined by the firm’s ability and incentives to revert 
to their optimal levels of investment. While the ability is related to adjustment costs, the 
incentives are mainly driven by off-target costs. Significant adjustment costs reduce firms’ 
ability to adjust investment levels and hence slow the adjustment process. However, greater 
off-target costs, ceteris paribus, give greater incentives to change investment expenditures and 
are therefore expected to increase the speed of adjustment. In what follows, it is also assumed 
that both off-target costs and adjustment costs are significantly greater for R&D investment 
than capital investment.  
 
2.1. Adjustment costs hypothesis  
There are distinct characteristics of R&D investment, which can lead to significant off-
target and adjustment costs. For example, R&D expenditures are mostly intangible and have 
lower collateral value and fetch lower values when liquidated (Hall, 1992). Furthermore, it is 
difficult to value R&D projects as there are usually no organized markets for them (Aboody & 
Lev, 2000). Even in the presence of an observed market price, it is argued that the market price 
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cannot fully reflect all information, mainly due to asymmetric information between insiders 
and outsiders (Griliches, 1995). The literature argues that standard solutions provided to 
adverse selection problems, such as signaling, reputation acquisition and financial 
intermediation, are likely to fail to work for innovation intensive firms (see, e.g., Takalo & 
Tanayama, 2010).  
Another distinct characteristic of R&D expenditures is that it comprises mainly wages, 
and hiring, firing and training costs of highly skilled employees. R&D costs are generally sunk, 
and innovation markets are segmented with oligopolistic characteristics, whereas tacit 
knowledge and skills of scientists make it difficult to fire them (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2002; 
Trushin, 2011). For the adjustment to target, installing new investment takes time and requires 
sunk costs, delivery lags, and learning (Cooper & Haltiwanger, 2006). Finally, R&D firms are 
more constrained in raising further finance, and borrowing constraints impose additional costs 
in adjusting investment upward. Carpenter and Petersen (2002) show that financing constraints 
and funding gaps arising from imperfections in capital markets affect high-tech sectors more 
than others. The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
H1: The speed of adjustment to attain the optimal level of R&D investment is lower than that 
for capital investment. 
 
2.2. Off-target costs hypothesis  
Compared to capital investment, R&D investments are highly firm specific and 
irreversible (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; Holt, 2007) and are not easily re-deployable (Williamson, 
1988). They are also greatly exposed to pre-emptive risk (threat of losing a growth option due 
to pre-emption), which leads to fierce competition in the R&D market (Bhattacharya & Ritter, 
1983). Moreover, R&D investment opportunities are often associated with a high winner’s 
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advantage and a significant loss in market share of the losing firm. This reduces the lifetime of 
the firm’s investment opportunities, forcing the firm to invest sooner to ensure continuing 
growth (Moritzen, 2015). All these features point to significant off-target costs for R&D 
investment and thus suggest that firms desire to adjust rapidly to their optimal levels of 
investment. The above arguments lead to the second hypothesis of this paper: 
 
H2: The speed of adjustment to attain the optimal level of R&D investment is greater than that 
for capital investment. 
 
2.3. Financial crisis hypothesis 
In developing and testing the above predictions, this study differentiates between the 
periods before, during and after the recent financial crisis of 2007. Both the availability and 
cost of external finance are adversely affected during crises due to greater extent of market 
imperfections (Rafferty & Funk, 2004; Almeida, Campello, & Weisbach., 2011; Aghion, 
Askenazy, Berman, Cette, & Eymard, 2012; Mancusi &Vezzulli, 2014). Although both types 
of investment are expected to be affected adversely by the crisis, an asymmetry is expected to 
arise in the level of investment and the adjustment behavior of firms with respect to R&D and 
capital expenditures. To this end, the recent financial crisis provides a natural laboratory to 
study how firm-characteristics affect optimal investment and the adjustment process (Brown 
& Petersen, 2015).  
The predictions regarding the impact of the financial crisis on R&D investment are not 
clear-cut. If exogenous shocks, such as financial crises, push actual R&D investment below or 
above target investment level, one would expect a higher speed of adjustment to re-establish 
target R&D investment. This is because, compared to capital investment, the expected costs of 
deviating from the target are higher. However, one could expect a slower speed of adjustment 
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given the high adjustment costs of R&D investment, particularly during the crisis period when 
the external financing for R&D projects is more difficult to obtain. 
Prior research suggests that financing constraints are more relevant to R&D than capital 
expenditures (see, e.g., Mulkay, Hall, & Mairesse, 2001; Czarnitzki & Hottenrott, 2011). 
However, Bond, Harhoff and Van Reenen (1999) claim that R&D firms are a self-selected 
group that face fewer financial constraints. In line with this argument, studies by Himmelberg 
and Petersen (1994) and Cincera (2003) imply that given the existence of significant adjustment 
costs for innovation investment, firms will engage in R&D activities only if they do not expect 
to be significantly affected by credit constraints. This paper incorporates these two opposing 
views.  
 Finally, Bernanke and Gertler (1989) find that adverse macroeconomic shocks not only 
hamper the functioning of financial markets but also exacerbate adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. Consequently, during financial crises, firms are more likely to experience 
severe cash flow shortages. Moreover, Minton and Schrand (1999) show that firms do not 
resort to external capital markets to fully cover cash flow shortfalls, and hence, they can 
permanently forgo investment. This suggests that during financial crises, firms are possibly 
more concerned with prioritizing R&D against capital investment. Thus, during crises, off-
target costs would be relatively more important than adjustment costs for R&D expenditures, 
implying a greater speed of adjustment. This also supports the view that capital investment is 
shorter term than R&D investment. Short-term investment takes relatively little time to build 
and therefore generates output (and liquidity) relatively quickly. However, R&D investment 
takes longer to complete although it contributes more to productivity growth (see Hall, 1992, 
Aghion & Saint-Paul, 1998, Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee, & Manova, 2010). Consistent with 
these points, firms are expected to increase R&D target adjustment speed faster than capital 
investment during and in the aftermath of a crisis. 
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H3: Following the financial crisis, the speed of adjustment to attain the optimal level of R&D 
investment increased faster than that for capital investment. 
 
 
3. Theory and empirical specification 
In what follows, a motivation is provided as to the theoretical foundations of the 
investment models tested and the methodology used in this study. 
 
3.1. Static model  
The standard empirical specification of the neoclassical investment under perfect 
capital markets assumptions is given as follows: 
INVi,t = β1CF/TAi,t + β3Qi,t + ui,t                  (1) 
where INV is the ratio of either capital expenditures to total assets (CE/TA) or research and 
development expenditures to total assets (R&D/TA) for firm i in period t, and CF and Q give 
firms’ cash flows and growth opportunities, respectively. Under a frictionless model of 
investment, firms are assumed to have no information costs and/or sufficient internal funds to 
finance their desired investment levels. It is therefore predicted that only changes in growth 
opportunities (Q) have an effect on investment and internal funds (CF) do not influence 
investment levels. Accordingly, firms always achieve their desired levels of investment by 
maintaining optimal capital stock. In addition, in this static specification, present investment 
decisions are assumed to be independent of past investment decisions. It is shown that the 
estimated coefficients can then be biased as contemporaneous and lagged investments are 
expected to be positively associated (Gatchev et al., 2010).  
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3.2. Dynamic model  
The dynamic approach taken in this study relates to the traditional Q-theory, the 
neoclassical theory of investment with adjustment costs function. It recognizes that markets are 
not frictionless, i.e., subject to informational costs, and there is an intertemporal link between 
current and past investment levels. It considers the investment process in two stages. In the 
first, firms decide on their optimal (desired) investment levels, INV*, on the basis of relevant 
information available at time t. The unobservable target investment of firms, INV*it, is taken as 
a function of several firm-specific characteristics, K, suggested by theory, and a disturbance 
term ɛit. As explained later, K includes CF/TA and Q as well as additional control variables for 
each type of investment: 
it
k
kitkit xINV  *           (2) 
where firms are represented by subscript i=1, ..., N, and time by t=1, ..., T . 
In the second stage, firms are considered attempting to adjust their investment in order 
for their current investment to be close to the target ratio.  This leads to the following partial 
adjustment: 
)()( 1,
*
1,   tiittiit INVINVINVINV         (3) 
where INVit is the actual investment ratio in t, and hence, (INVit - INVi,t-1) and (INV
*
it - INVi,t-1) 
can be interpreted as the actual and target changes, respectively, where only a fraction  of the 
target change is achieved. It can be shown that  is the ratio of the off-target costs, , to, (+) 
where  is the costs of adjustment, and the cost function for adjusting investment is given as 
C(Kt) = (INVt – INVt*)2 + (INVt - INVt-1)2. While the first term of the RHS of the cost function 
gives the weight of the desired change in investment, the second term presents the weight of 
the actual change firms can achieve. 
12 
 
The value of the adjustment coefficient  lies between 0 and 1, capturing the ability and 
incentives of firms to adjust to their target investment levels. If =1, the model implies that 
firms are able to adjust immediately, i.e., INVit = INV
*
it, implying zero adjustment costs. 
However, if =0, adjustment costs are so large that firms cannot change their existing 
investment levels, i.e.,  INVit = INVi,t-1. Put differently,  gives the relative importance of each 
type of cost in the adjustment process.  Combining (2) and (3) yields 


 
1
1,0
k
ittikitktiit udxINVINV         (4) 
where 0 = 1-, k = k, and uit = it, and uit has the same properties as ɛit. The positive 
coefficient of the lagged investment in Equation (4) provides support for the view that firms 
pursue a target investment policy, and they partially adjust towards an optimal investment ratio, 
with the estimated adjustment speed coefficient given by λ = 1-
0 . The adjustment coefficient 
is expected to be close to 1 if the costs of being off target are significantly higher than the costs 
of adjustment. Alternatively, the adjustment coefficient is expected to be close to 0 if 
adjustment costs are much higher than off-target costs. In all estimations, time dummies are 
included to control for firm-invariant time-specific effects given by dt in Equation (4). 
However, αi captures time-invariant firm-specific effects including industry effects. 
 
3.3. Alternative investment specifications 
It is acknowledged that the underlying factors that determine each type of investment 
are different. In what follows, a different empirical model is adopted for each investment, 
noting that capital and R&D investments are affected by a different set of firm-specific factors. 
This study estimates the following model to explain the capital investment behavior of firms.  
CE/TAi,t = β1CE/TAi,t-1 + β2CF/TAi,t + β3Qi,t + β4TD/TAi,t + β5PPE/TAi,t 
+ β6DIV/TAi,t + αi + dt + ui,t              (5) 
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In this augmented capital investment specification, in addition to the lagged capital investment 
ratio, CE/TA, cash flows ratio, CF/TA, and growth opportunities, Q, three additional firm-
specific variables are incorporated. They are leverage, TD/TA, tangibility, PPE/TA and 
dividend payout, DIV/TA, ratios. How much investment firms can undertake is determined not 
only by their growth opportunities but also by their ability to raise external debt. The tangibility 
of assets in turn determines the extent to which firms can borrow. Finally, dividends are used 
in the literature as a proxy for the degree of financial constraints. Equity capital is less relevant 
for fixed capital investment, as the extent of asymmetric information regarding fixed assets is 
limited. It is hence not included in the capital investment specification.  
However, the R&D model in this study includes similar firm characteristics to those 
suggested in Brown and Petersen (2009, 2011, 2015), given by the following equation: 
R&D/TAi,t = β1R&D/TAi,(t-1) + β2CF/TAi,t + β3Qi,t + β4CASH/TAi,t 
+ β5SSTOCK/TAi,t + β6PSTOCK/TAi,t + αi + dt + ui,t           (6) 
where CASH/TA gives cash balances, SSTOCK/TA is the ratio of sale of stocks, and 
PSTOCK/TA is the ratio of purchase of stocks (the definitions of the variables used in the 
analysis is given in Table 1). For R&D investment, the ability of firms to raise external debt is 
limited due to the intangible nature of R&D expenditures. It is therefore important to control 
in the specification for the extent to which firms can resort to internal funds (for which cash 
holdings serve as a proxy) and equity capital. 
The main differences between the two specifications relate to the ways in which each 
type is financed. The findings in previous research point to significantly greater adjustment 
costs (Hall, Griliches, & Hausman,1986; Lach & Schankerman, 1989) associated with R&D 
investment. To diminish the high adjustment costs, firms decide to smooth out R&D 
investments over time (Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994; Hall, 2002). One way of doing this is 
to use cash reserves. To this end, Brown and Petersen (2011) find that firms use cash reserves 
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to smooth their R&D expenditures. Debt is commonly viewed as not suitable for funding R&D 
investment due to information asymmetries, adverse selection and moral hazard problems 
(Hall, 2002). As equity allows more discretion, Williamson (1988) concludes that in financing 
R&D investment equity capital is a more appropriate source of financing than debt. The study 
of Brown and Petersen (2009) highlights the recently increasing role of R&D investment in 
comparison with capital investment and explains it with the rising importance of public equity 
as a source of funds. Leverage is hence excluded from the R&D specification while it is in the 
capital investment one. It is well established that high levels of debt lead to agency conflicts 
between shareholders and creditors, and hence to underinvestment (Myers, 1977) and risk-
shifting (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) problems.  
The empirical strategy of this paper is to estimate the above specifications for different 
sub-periods, where the crisis period is distinguished for the purpose of comparison with the 
pre-crisis and the post-crisis periods.  As explained earlier, the main objective is to examine 
the extent to which the speed of adjustment to target changed under the influence of the 
financial crisis.  In the following, the results for the periods 2002-2007 (pre-crisis period), 
2008-2016 (crisis and post-crisis), 2008-2009 (crisis) and 2010-2016 (post-crisis) are 
presented.  
 
3.4. Methodology 
In line with previous studies, the GMM estimation procedure structured by Blundell 
and Bond (1998) is employed to estimate the dynamic model given in Equations (5) and (6) 
(see, e.g., Beck, Levine, & Loayza., 2000; Beck & Levine, 2004; Bond, Elston, Mairesse, & 
Mulkay, 2003; Brown et al, 2009). It is known that estimating a dynamic model with firm fixed 
effects using OLS and within-group estimates will lead to biased estimates (Nickell, 1981). 
Furthermore, the independent variables in Equations (5) and (6) are potentially endogenous, 
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and therefore, there is a need to use instrumental variables. To control for the potential 
endogeneity problem, instruments for the explanatory variables dated only t-2 and t-3 are used 
in the estimations. Since earlier instruments do not yield consistent estimates for dynamic 
panels, they are not included among the instruments used in the estimations (see, e.g., 
Martinsson, 2010). The GMM estimation approach enables us not only to control for 
endogeneity and unobserved firm heterogeneity but also to examine the dynamic nature of the 
investment decision of the firms in the sample. 
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on the validity of instruments used, for 
which the absence of higher order serial correlation in the idiosyncratic component of the error 
term is crucial. To this end, first, the Hansen J-statistic of over-identifying restrictions is 
provided to test for the absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term. This 
test is distributed as a χ2 with r-k degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of the validity 
of the r instruments, where k is the number of estimated parameters. To assess the validity of 
instruments, two further test statistics are provided for the existence of first and second order 
serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals (denoted as AR1 and AR2) where the 
presence of a second-order correlation could render the GMM estimator inconsistent. 
 
 
4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics  
 
4.1. Sample selection 
The data used in the analysis are obtained from the Worldscope database. The panel 
datasets for this study were created as follows. First, financial and utility firms were excluded 
from the sample. Second, those firm-years for which the value of capital expenditures and/or 
R&D expenses is equal zero are discarded. In the spirit of Brown and Petersen’s (2011) study, 
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only firms that invest positively in R&D and capital projects are considered in this analysis. 
The vast majority of non-R&D firms are in industries that traditionally have little or no R&D 
expenditures (e.g., apparel, textiles, lumber, furniture, and printing and publishing); thus, the 
non-R&D sample is not useful for directly testing the importance of R&D and capital 
investment adjustment speed. Third, to conduct the GMM estimations, a further restriction that 
all firms have at least four consecutive time-series observations for all the variables included 
in the model is imposed. Thus, the number of consecutive years for each firm in the sample 
varies between 4 and 16. Finally, in an attempt to control for the impact of extreme values on 
the analysis, outliers are dropped by removing the values of each variable that lies outside the 
1st and the 99th percentile range. These criteria result in an unbalanced panel of firms. By 
allowing firms to enter and exit the sample, the use of an unbalanced panel partially mitigates 
potential selection and survivor bias. This selection process yields a total of 1,266 US firms, 
which represent 10,865 firm-year observations for the sample period 2002-2016.  
The definitions of the variables used in this study are provided in Table 1. Additionally, 
Table 2 gives over time industry breakdown in accordance with the Industrial Classification 
Benchmark of firms included in the sample. It is not surprising that more than 50 percent of 
firms are contained in two broad industries: industrials (2000) and technology (9000), which 
generally comprise high-tech firms.  
- Insert Tables 1 & 2 here - 
 
4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the mean and standard deviation values for the sample period and three 
sub-periods, namely, the pre-crisis (2002-07), the crisis (2008-09), and the post-crisis (2010-
16) periods. The average values of R&D/TA and CE/TA ratios during the entire sample period 
are 0.058 and 0.041, respectively. Partly by construction, the average firm in the sample spent 
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substantially more on R&D investment than on capital expenditures. The mean value for cash 
flow is 7.8 percent whereas a typical firm’s market-to-book value is approximately 1.92. 
Furthermore, on average, firms have 18.2 percent of debt, 20.9 percent of collateral assets and 
19.6 percent of cash reserves. Finally, the average dividend-to-assets ratio is 1.4 percent, 
whereas the average sale of stock by firms corresponds to 1.6 percent of total assets, the average 
stock purchase-to-assets ratio is 2.4 percent, suggesting that the average firm in the sample 
engaged more in repurchasing than issuing equity capital.  
- Insert Tables 3 here - 
Moving on to the differences across different sub-periods, the results reveal significant 
differences across the two sets of sub-periods. The average capital expenditure dropped to 4.1 
percent during the crisis from its pre-crisis average of 4.3 percent. It continued to decrease in 
the post-crisis period, with an average of 3.9 percent. The pattern for R&D expenditures is, 
however, somewhat different.  It increased from 5.4 percent in the pre-crisis period to 6.1 
percent during the crisis period. This corresponds to an approximate 13 percent increase in 
R&D investment during the crisis period. It then dropped back to a level, i.e., 5.6 percent, 
which is slightly higher than the pre-crisis one. This provides initial support for the prediction 
that it is important to maintain R&D investment at times when the cost of capital is expected 
to be higher. However, these initial findings are not sufficient to conclude that firms also 
operate around their optimal investment levels and adjust to them relatively quickly.  
Not surprisingly, growth opportunities, measured by Tobin’s Q, also declined during 
the crisis period from the pre-crisis level of approximately 1.96 to 1.54 and increased again 
during the post-crisis to approximately 1.96, suggesting that firms had lower valuable 
investment opportunities during the crisis period. Importantly, the average cash flow ratio 
across the two periods, the pre-crisis and crisis, declined significantly from 8.2 to 6.5 and 
increased to 8.1 during the post-crisis period. This suggests that the ability of firms to finance 
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their investments through internal sources decreased sharply during the crisis but reverted after 
the crisis back to the pre-crisis level. Furthermore, the total debt ratio dropped slightly from 
17.9 in the pre-crisis to 17.3 during the crisis but increased significantly to 19.3 during the post-
crisis period.   
A different pattern is observed with respect to asset tangibility ratio, which decreased 
from 22.6 percent in the pre-crisis to 21.2 during the crisis and dropped again to 19.8 during 
the post-crisis period. However, the opposite is noted for firms’ cash holdings, which increased 
from 18.4 percent in the pre-crisis to 19.1 during the crisis and to 19.6 during the post-crisis 
period. This corresponds to a 6.5 percent increase between the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. 
Additionally, the crisis led firms to cut back on their stock issues by approximately 47 percent 
(from 1.9 to 1 percent). During the post-crisis period, the average stock issuance increased to 
1.5 percent of total assets. In contrast, firms on average purchased more stocks during the crisis 
compared to the pre-crisis period, increasing the purchase-assets ratio from 2.1 percent to 2.6 
percent and continued to do so in the post-crisis period by further increasing the ratio to 2.7. 
Similarly, firms paid higher dividends during the crisis and post-crisis periods at 1.5 percent 
compared to the pre-crisis level of 1.3 percent. 
Overall, these findings suggest that the impact of the financial crisis on corporate 
investment was observed more in firms’ R&D expenditures than in capital investment. Firms 
generally maintained their capital investment policy during and after the crisis. It is worth 
noting that the level of capital (R&D) investment dropped (increased) in the post-crisis period 
in comparison with the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, compared with the pre-crisis period, 
during the post-crisis period, firms’ Tobin’s Q, total debt, dividend payout, cash holdings and 
stock purchase average levels increased, whereas the levels of cash flow, tangibility and stock 
issue declined. On average, firms seem to have held on to their R&D investment level during 
the crisis period and actually invested more.  
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5. Results 
In the following, the results are reported regarding the empirical determinants of capital 
expenditures (CE/TA) and R&D expenditures (R&D/TA) with a specific focus on the speed of 
adjustment. First, the results are provided for the entire sample period (2002-2016) and then 
for a set of sub-periods for comparisons between the periods 2002-2007 (pre-crisis) and 2008-
2016 (crisis and post-crisis). Then, in an attempt to shed further light on the crisis period alone, 
the results are given separately for the periods 2008-2009 (crisis) and 2010-2016 (post-crisis).  
 
5.1. Baseline results 
To start, the baseline model given in Equations (5) and (6) are estimated for the entire 
period 2002-2016 for the capital and R&D investment, respectively. The results in Table 4 
show that the estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (L.INV) is positive and 
statistically significant in both specifications. Specifically, the estimated adjustment speeds for 
CE/TA and R&D/TA are approximately 0.66 and 0.20, respectively, for the entire period. Thus, 
as predicted and explained earlier, the R&D/TA adjustment speed is significantly slower than 
that for CE/TA, suggesting that firms can revert back to their desired levels of capital 
investment more quickly than R&D investment. This is in line with the first hypothesis of the 
paper that firms adjust to their capital investment target more quickly. If one assumes off-target 
costs are similar for both types of investments, this finding is then possibly due to that the 
adjustment costs for R&D investment are greater. However, if the adjustment costs are similar 
for both types of investment, it is then possible that firms adjust to their capital investment 
faster as the costs of being off target capital investment are greater. 
- Insert Table 4 here - 
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As for the factors that are common to each investment type, namely, cash flows and 
growth opportunities, the results are mixed. While the estimated coefficient of cash flows, 
CF/TA is positive and significant for capital investment, the effect of cash flows on R&D 
investment is significant and negative. The estimated coefficient for Tobin’s Q is positive but 
insignificant for both specifications.  
Moving on to the results for the control variables for capital investment, the findings 
reveal that capital expenditures are lower for firms with higher levels of leverage and dividend 
payouts. The finding for leverage possibly suggests that greater leverage may hamper firms’ 
ability to raise further external finance for investment purposes, and hence, high leverage firms 
end up investing less. However, paying dividends to shareholders may point to lower growth 
opportunities and hence less investment. Finally, not surprisingly, the relationship between the 
tangibility of assets, PPE/TA, and capital investment is positive and significant at the 1 percent 
level. While this is partly due to construction, as capital investment is tangible in nature, a 
higher tangibility ratio can be a proxy for the firm’s ability to raise external debt, as the 
collateral value of tangible assets is greater and verifiable. 
As explained earlier, the control variables for R&D investment are different. There is a 
positive and significant relationship between cash balances of firms and their R&D 
expenditures. Firms with greater flexibility, which is attained through higher cash reserves, are 
able to invest more in R&D projects. Moreover, the estimated coefficient of stock issue 
(purchase) is negative (positive) and significant in influencing R&D investment. The results 
provide strong evidence that firms with higher stock issues (purchases) generally have lower 
(higher) levels of R&D investment. Such negative (positive) results may arise from the nature 
of R&D projects, which are associated with greater levels of asymmetric information. The 
capital raised through stock issuance would hence not be employed in R&D investment. 
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5.2. The analysis of pre-crisis vs. crisis and post-crisis periods 
Table 5 gives the estimation results for different sub-periods, comparing the pre-crisis 
period (2002-2007) with the crisis and post-crisis periods (2008-2016). For each sub-period, 
both capital and R&D models are estimated. Comparisons can be made with respect to different 
types of investment in the same period as well as across different periods for the same type of 
investment. In the following, the main focus in discussing the results will be on the estimated 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, L.INV, which can take the form of capital 
(CE/TA) or research and development (R&D) investment. For brevity, the findings regarding 
the control variables are not discussed in detail. The estimated coefficients remain similar 
qualitatively.  
There are two main observations in relation to the speed of adjustment. First, in line 
with the earlier findings, the estimated speed of adjustment is greater for capital investment in 
both periods. Firms attempt to reach to their target levels of capital investment faster than they 
do for R&D investment, providing strong support for the first hypothesis that the speed of 
adjustment of R&D investment is lower than of capital investment. In the pre-crisis period, the 
estimated coefficients of adjustment speed for capital investment and R&D expenditures are 
0.51 and 0.07, respectively. The latter adjustment speed suggests that firms are able to complete 
only 7 percent of their desired change in their R&D investment in a year. In addition to the 
implication that the adjustment seems to be slow, this result may also suggest that there is 
almost no persistency in the level of R&D expenditures in the pre-crisis period as though firms 
do not have a target investment R&D ratio. 
- Insert Table 5 here - 
Second, it is interesting to note that the speed of adjustment for both types of 
investments is greater during the crisis and post-crisis period. Although it does not change 
greatly between the two sub-periods for CE/TA, namely, from approximately 0.51 to 0.63, 
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respectively, it increases for R&D/TA from 0.07 to approximately 0.28, suggesting that firms 
adjust four times faster during this period compared to the pre-crisis level.  
 
5.3. The analysis of the crisis vs. post-crisis periods 
In Table 6, further analysis is provided focusing only on the crisis and post-crisis 
periods, by investigating how the speed of adjustment changes between the crisis (2008-2009) 
and the post-crisis (2010-2016) periods. The estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable provides interesting insights.  Specifically, during the crisis the speed of adjustment to 
target R&D investment (R&D/TA) is significantly greater in comparison with the results for 
the pre-crisis period (reported in table 5). In addition, the estimated speed of adjustment to 
target capital (CE/TA) investment is statistically insignificant. These findings suggest that 
firms are motivated to maintain their targets only with respect to R&D expenses, albeit still 
with a low speed. There is no meaningful target behavior for capital investment.  
Following the crisis period, however, the speed of adjustment for both investments 
becomes statistically significant. Firms in the aftermath of the crisis seem to have returned to 
their target investment behavior with respect to capital investment and maintain their crisis 
speed of adjustment with respect to R&D. During the post-crisis period, the adjustment speeds 
for capital and R&D expenditures are approximately 0.55 and 0.24, respectively.  As reported 
earlier in Table 5, the respective numbers for the pre-crisis period are 0.51 and 0.07, showing 
sharp increase in the R&D adjustment speed in the post-crisis period, whereas a moderate 
increase is observed for capital investment. These findings are in line with Hypothesis 3 of this 
paper, predicting that the increase in the speed of R&D investment adjustment following the 
impact of financial crises is greater than that for capital investment.  
- Insert Table 6 here - 
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Taken together, the findings in Tables 5 and 6 clearly show that firms adjusted 
significantly faster to all their investment targets in the post-crisis period. During and following 
the crisis, the speed of adjustment increased significantly, albeit to a lesser extent for capital 
investment. These findings raise further questions as to what determines the differences in the 
impact of the financial crisis on the adjustment speed behavior of firms. In the following, 
additional analysis is provided to shed light on the likely firm-specific factors that influence 
the adjustment speed of different types of investment. As the observed behavior mainly relates 
to the post-crisis period, the results are presented only for the 2010-2016 sub-period. 
- Insert Table 7 here - 
In conducting the analysis, firms are divided into two sub-groups (low and high) in 
accordance with the median values of several financial characteristics, namely, cash flow, total 
debt, tangibility, dividend payout, cash holdings, stock issue, stock purchase and sales. The 
same investment specification is estimated in each case, but only the estimated coefficients for 
the lagged dependent variable are reported for brevity.  
The results show that the difference in the speed of adjustment between CE/TA and 
R&D/TA ratios is economically significant in all estimations. Importantly, it is never greater 
for R&D than capital investment. Furthermore, the sub-groups in which firms adjust relatively 
faster to their target R&D investment are low-stock purchase, high-stock issue, low-sales, low-
debt, high-cash, and low-dividend firms. Although it is difficult to provide a clear-cut 
interpretation of each coefficient, it seems that firms that have greater financial flexibility 
through, for example, higher cash balances and low levels of debt are able to adjust faster to 
their target levels of R&D investment. However, the highest speed of R&D target adjustment 
is approximately 30 percent of the desired change on annual basis.  
The factors that explain the changes in the capital investment speed of adjustment are 
different. In contrast to R&D investment, the fastest (slowest) adjusting sub-groups of firms 
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for capital investment are high-debt (low-debt) and low-cash (high-cash) firms. This is an 
interesting finding as the factors that lower the R&D adjustment speed seem to have an opposite 
impact on the speed of adjustment for capital investment. The findings indicate that while the 
higher R&D adjustment speed can be attained when firms adjust slowly in relation to their 
capital investment targets, the target capital investment adjustment speed does not seem to 
depend on how fast companies adjust to their R&D investment. 
Overall, the results in Table 7 imply that the adjustment behavior of firms during the 
post-crisis period is not homogenous and the heterogeneity depends on several important 
financial characteristics. More importantly, there is an asymmetry regarding the impact of these 
variables on the speed of adjustment towards capital and R&D target levels. However, low-
cash flow and high sales seem to work favorably for both types of investment.  
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper investigates the investment behavior of R&D firms with respect to both 
capital and R&D expenditures. This is done by conducting a dynamic panel data analysis using 
a sample of 1,266 non-financial US firms during the period 2002-2016. Target R&D and capital 
investment levels are estimated by focusing on the speed of target adjustment. The empirical 
analysis is conducted separately for the entire period and three sub-periods: the pre-crisis, the 
crisis and the post-crisis. Additional analysis is conducted to examine how various firm-
specific attributes and the global financial crisis of 2007 have affected target adjustment.  
The analysis provides clear evidence that firms exhibit a long-term target behavior 
regarding both R&D and capital investment. However, there are striking differences between 
the adjustment speeds to R&D and capital investment targets. Firms adjust to their capital 
investment target much faster than R&D target, regardless of the estimation period. Given that 
capital investment can be delayed and is reversible to some extent, the findings possibly suggest 
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that the greater speed of adjustment of capital investment is due to relatively lower adjustment 
costs rather than greater significant off-target costs. However, this does not suggest that off-
target costs are negligible. It is almost impossible to disentangle the two costs in the analysis, 
and hence, the results provide important insights into the relative importance of the two types 
of costs rather than clear-cut inferences. 
As for the R&D adjustment speed, there is strong evidence that the costs of adjustment 
to R&D are significantly high, evidenced by low adjustment speeds. The sample of this study 
comprises positive R&D firms, and there is ample evidence in prior research that the costs of 
being away from target R&D levels are also significant due to pre-emptive risk and reduced 
lifetime of the firm’s investment opportunities. Further analysis reveals that the R&D 
adjustment speed increases in the crisis and post-crisis periods. This is an interesting finding 
as the adjustment costs during crisis periods are normally expected to be greater due to higher 
cost of external finance. The results, however, show that the higher adjustment speeds for R&D 
firms during and after the crisis period are observed in firms with the ability to issue equity 
capital and those with greater cash balances.  
Overall, the empirical analysis in this paper enhances the understanding of corporate 
investment behavior in a number of important ways and raises further research questions. First, 
the evidence is strong to support the view that firms differ in their efforts and ability to maintain 
the optimal levels of R&D and capital investment. This leads to an argument that there is further 
need to investigate how the two types of investment interact in determining the optimal level 
of total investment and the speed of target adjustment. Second, the results show that the 
adjustment process is not simple, and it needs to be specified more specifically. This is 
necessary to provide stronger insights into the dynamics of adjustment. In particular, the trade-
off between the costs of adjustments and the costs of being away from target investment should 
be well-specified to shed further light as to the adjustment process and understand better the 
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determinants of speed of adjustment. Third, the results with respect to the crisis period 
emphasize the importance of external factors in modeling corporate investment behavior. 
Using longer panel data to analyze the dynamics of corporate investment may conceal the 
changing dynamics over the period considered. Firm heterogeneity as well as time-specific 
effects may lead to misleading inferences unless they are controlled properly. These await 
future research. 
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Table 1 
Variables definitions 
Variable Definition Worldscope Code [WC #] 
CE/TA 
The ratio of capital expenditures to total 
assets 
[WC04601]/[WC02999] 
R&D/TA 
The ratio of research and development 
expenses to total assets 
[WC01201]/[WC02999] 
CF/TA 
The ratio of net income before 
extraordinary items and preferred 
dividends plus depreciation, depletion and 
amortization to total assets 
([WC01551] + 
[WC01151])/[WC02999] 
Q 
The ratio of book value of total assets 
minus the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity to book value of 
total asset 
([WC02999] – [WC03501] + 
[WC08001])/[WC02999] 
TD/TA The ratio of total debt to total assets [WC03255]/[WC02999] 
PPE/TA 
The ratio of property, plant and equipment 
- net to total assets 
[WC02501]/[WC02999] 
DIV/TA The ratio of dividend payout to total assets [WC04551]/[WC02999] 
CASH/TA 
The ratio of cash and short-term 
investments to total assets 
[WC02001]/[WC02999] 
SSTOCK/TA 
The ratio of sale of common and preferred 
stock to total assets 
[WC04251]/[WC02999] 
PSTOCK/TA 
The ratio of purchase of common and 
preferred stock to total assets 
[WC04751]/[WC02999] 
Notes: This table provides the definitions of the main variables used in the analysis. The 
variables are constructed from the Worldscope database, and the respective codes are shown 
in the table. 
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Table 2 
Sample distribution across industry and time 
Year 1 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 9000 Total 
 Oil & Gas 
Basic 
Materials 
Industrials 
Consumer 
Goods 
Health Care 
Consumer 
Services 
Telecommu
nications 
Technology  
2002 17 66 175 99 73 11 14 121 576 
2003 20 69 191 105 86 14 15 144 644 
2004 21 73 206 111 96 18 20 171 716 
2005 23 77 221 117 104 20 20 192 774 
2006 23 80 226 117 100 24 18 186 774 
2007 21 78 222 125 105 25 20 194 790 
2008 17 74 226 124 112 23 18 187 781 
2009 16 67 216 121 114 22 15 181 752 
2010 15 62 217 124 107 22 18 188 753 
2011 17 65 230 135 112 24 18 197 798 
2012 18 59 227 132 116 25 16 199 792 
2013 15 57 224 127 107 23 15 194 762 
2014 14 51 208 121 103 21 13 184 715 
2015 13 50 193 116 94 18 11 170 665 
2016 10 45 175 100 84 13 7 139 573 
Notes: This table presents the number of firms by Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB). The sample is constructed from publicly traded 
firms with coverage in the Worldscope database during 2002-2016. Firms with ICB codes from utility (7000) and financial (8000) industries 
are discarded. Firm-year observations are excluded if capital expenditures or R&D expenses are negative or zero. Firms without four 
consecutive years of observations during the period 2002-2016 are dropped. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Entire 
period:  
Pre-crisis 
period:  
Crisis 
period:  
Post Crisis 
period: 
 2002-2016  2002-2007  2008-2009  2010-2016 
CE/TA 0.041  0.043  0.041  0.039 
 -0.036  -0.037  -0.034  -0.034 
R&D/TA 0.058  0.054  0.061  0.056 
 -0.069  -0.061  -0.079  -0.066 
CF/TA 0.078  0.082  0.065  0.081 
 -0.098  -0.092  -0.113  -0.091 
Q 1.919  1.957  1.54  1.961 
 -1.111  -1.075  -0.832  -1.141 
TD/TA 0.182  0.179  0.173  0.193 
 -0.162  -0.156  -0.16  -0.164 
PPE/TA 0.209  0.226  0.212  0.198 
 -0.159  -0.161  -0.157  -0.155 
DIV/TA 0.014  0.013  0.015  0.015 
 -0.021  -0.019  -0.022  -0.022 
CASH/TA 0.196  0.184  0.191  0.196 
 -0.177  -0.177  -0.173  -0.166 
SSTOCK/TA 0.016  0.019  0.01  0.015 
 -0.044  -0.044  -0.03  -0.043 
PSTOCK/TA 0.024  0.021  0.026  0.027 
 -0.051  -0.05  -0.052  -0.052 
Obs. 10865  3935  1198  4698 
Firms 1266  716  651  762 
Notes: This table presents mean and standard deviation (in parentheses and italic) values for 
the entire period sample, pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis, crisis and post-crisis period 
samples. The sample period is 2002 to 2016. The pre-crisis period includes years 2002 to 
2007 whereas the crisis and post-crisis period comprises years 2008 to 2016; the crisis period 
covers years 2008 and 2009, and the post-crisis period ranges from year 2010 to 2016. The 
t-statistic is for the difference of means between the pre-crisis and crisis and post-crisis 
periods as well as the difference of means between the crisis and post crisis periods. ***, **, 
and * indicate the t-statistic is significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The 
definitions of the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 4 
The speed of adjustment in capital, R&D, and total investment targets during the period 
2002-2016 
Dep. Var. CE/TA R&D/TA 
L.INV 0.341*** 0.804*** 
 (0.061) (0.050) 
CF/TA 0.059*** -0.108*** 
 (0.018) (0.028) 
Q 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
TD/TA -0.013*  
 (0.008)  
PPE/TA 0.094***  
 (0.014)  
DIV/TA -0.171***  
 (0.064)  
CASH/TA  0.065*** 
  (0.018) 
SSTOCK/TA  -0.165** 
  (0.064) 
PSTOCK/TA  0.124*** 
  (0.031) 
Observations 9599 9599 
Firms 1266 1266 
AR1 p-value 0.000 0.000 
AR2 p-value 0.499 0.417 
HANSEN p-value 0.201 0.465 
Notes: This table presents the system GMM estimation results for the investment model in Equation 
(1) for all the firms in the sample during the entire period: 2002 to 2016. All regressions include time 
dummies. Lagged levels dated t-2 to t-3 are used as instruments for the endogenous variables. 
Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering are reported in parentheses. 
***, ** and * indicate the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. AR1 
and AR2, respectively, denote tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-
differenced residuals, asymptotically distributes as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The 
Hansen denotes a test of over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a χ2 under the 
null of valid instruments. The definitions of the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 
1. 
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Table 5 
Comparison of speeds of adjustment in capital, R&D, and total investment targets during 
the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods 
  Pre-crisis period:  Crisis and post-crisis period: 
 2002-2007  2008-2016 
Dep. Var. CE/TA R&D/TA  CE/TA R&D/TA 
L.INV 0.493*** 0.932***  0.369*** 0.720*** 
 (0.109) (0.070)  (0.095) (0.115) 
CF/TA 0.069** -0.110***  0.075** -0.101** 
 (0.032) (0.038)  (0.030) (0.046) 
Q 0.003 0.003  0.001 0.002 
 (0.004) (0.003)  (0.002) (0.003) 
TD/TA 0.019   -0.013  
 (0.027)   (0.011)  
PPE/TA 0.048   0.085***  
 (0.043)   (0.022)  
DIV/TA -0.027   -0.234**  
 (0.140)   (0.095)  
CASH/TA  0.042**   0.098** 
  (0.017)   (0.039) 
SSTOCK/TA  -0.152**   -0.194** 
  (0.070)   (0.091) 
PSTOCK/TA  0.051   0.093 
  (0.041)   (0.061) 
Observations 3219 3219  5347 5347 
Firms 716 716  884 884 
AR1 p-value 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
AR2 p-value 0.078 0.416  0.448 0.818 
HANSEN p-value 0.560 0.163  0.178 0.687 
Notes: This table presents the system GMM estimation results for the investment model in Equation 
(1) for the pre-crisis (2002-2007) and the crisis and post-crisis (2008-2016) periods. Asymptotic 
standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. AR1 and AR2, 
respectively, denote tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced 
residuals, asymptotically distributes as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen 
denotes a test of over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a χ2 under the null of 
valid instruments. The definitions of the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 6 
Comparison of speeds of adjustment in capital, R&D, and total investment targets during 
the crisis and post-crisis periods 
 Crisis period: 2008-2009  Post-crisis period: 2010-2016 
Dep. Var. CE/TA R&D/TA  CE/TA R&D/TA 
L.INV 0.203 0.716***  0.446*** 0.761*** 
 (0.177) (0.065)  (0.125) (0.116) 
CF/TA 0.027 -0.129  0.083** -0.131*** 
 (0.045) (0.106)  (0.041) (0.050) 
Q -0.000 0.001  -0.001 0.002 
 (0.005) (0.007)  (0.002) (0.004) 
TD/TA -0.023   -0.002  
 (0.034)   (0.012)  
PPE/TA 0.183***   0.072**  
 (0.047)   (0.030)  
DIV/TA -0.144   -0.303**  
 (0.213)   (0.118)  
CASH/TA  0.035   0.083** 
  (0.082)   (0.039) 
SSTOCK/TA  -0.194   -0.227*** 
  (0.187)   (0.086) 
PSTOCK/TA  0.109**   0.075 
  (0.053)   (0.084) 
Observations 1094 1094  3936 3936 
Firms 547 547  762 762 
AR1 p-value 0.010 0.002  0.000 0.000 
AR2 p-value . .  0.190 0.815 
HANSEN p-value 0.018 0.610  0.165 0.663 
Notes: This table presents the system GMM estimation results for the investment model in Equation 
(1) for the crisis (2008-2009) and the post-crisis (2010-2016) periods. Asymptotic standard errors 
robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. AR1 and AR2, respectively, 
denote tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, 
asymptotically distributes as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Hansen denotes a test 
of over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as a χ2 under the null of valid instruments. 
The definitions of the variables used in the analysis are provided in Table 1. 
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Table 7 
Financial characteristics and speed of adjustment during the post-crisis period (2010-2016) 
Dep. Var. CE/TA R&D/TA  CE/TA R&D/TA 
 Low Cash Flow Firms  High Cash Flow Firms 
L.INV 0.382*** 0.759***  0.449** 0.960*** 
 Low Debt Firms  High Debt Firms 
L.INV 0.564*** 0.742***  0.244** 1.052*** 
 Low Tangibility Firms  High Tangibility Firms 
L.INV 0.253 0.721***    0.339*** 0.921*** 
 Low Dividend Firms  High Dividend Firms 
L.INV 0.359** 0.714***   0.317*** 0.976*** 
 Low Cash Holdings Firms  High Cash Holdings Firms 
L.INV 0.281** 0.965***   0.465*** 0.701*** 
 Low Stock Issue Firms  High Stock Issue Firms 
L.INV 0.402*** 0.985***   0.424*** 0.728*** 
 Low Stock Purchase Firms  High Stock Purchase Firms 
L.INV 0.484*** 0.699***    0.435*** 0.990*** 
 Low Sales Firms  High Sales Firms 
L.INV 0.411*** 0.701***  0.367*** 0.997*** 
Notes: This table presents the system GMM estimation results for the investment model in Equation 
(1) for various sub-groups of firms during the post-crisis period. Firms are classified into low and 
high sub-groups according to their financial characteristic ratio in relation to sample median of the 
respective financial characteristic ratio. The estimation period for both sub-groups is the post–crisis 
period (2010-2016). Asymptotic standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering are 
reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. AR1 and AR2, respectively, denote tests for first-order and second-order serial 
correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributes as N(0,1) under the null of no 
serial correlation. The Hansen denotes a test of over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically 
distributed as a χ2 under the null of valid instruments. The definitions of the variables used in the 
analysis are provided in Table 1. 
 
